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Recent studies  in the literature examining  impact of government seed price intervention on 
adoption of Bt cotton get different results depending on the specifics of the situation analyzed. 
According to one study, reduction in seed prices enables farmers to buy seeds at lower prices 
and this can result in surge of area sown under Bt cotton. The other view holds that seed price 
interventions have little impact on the adoption rates rather these interventions may adversely 
affect firms’ incentives to innovate. Which of the two views characterize adoption of Bt cotton in 
India? Using three variations of dynamic logistic model, this paper analyzes the impact of 
certain economic factors like seed prices, technological development, and cotton prices on the 
diffusion of Bt cotton in India. It uses panel data set covering 9 major cotton growing states over 
the years 2002 to 2008 and finds that although seed prices were significant in impacting the 
diffusion rates,  its impact was limited. The  study also sheds light on the significance of 
technological development in impacting diffusion rates. 
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    Bt cotton is the first agricultural biotech crop that has been commercialized in India. Since its 
approval for commercial cultivation in 2002, there has been a considerable increase in the area 
under Bt cotton. The adoption of Bt cotton has been remarkable in India with around 168-fold 
increase between 2002-09. 
    Recent studies on Bt cotton have partitioned the welfare created by genetically modified (GM) 
crops among agricultural producers, consumers and innovating input firms (Moschini and Lapan, 
2000). In these studies the market price of the technology is not questioned; it is assumed to be 
fixed at its current level. Given that most GM crops have been commercialized by private sector 
multinationals, however, there are fears that monopolistic market structure may prevail resulting 
in excessive prices being charged for Bt seeds, which may restrict technology access for resource 
poor farmers in developing countries (Lalitha, 2004). This concern has been expressed in the 
context of many developing countries and India decided to intervene in the pricing of Bt cotton 
seeds. 
    A US based firm Monsanto in collaboration with an Indian firm, Maharashtra Hybrid Seed 
Company (MAHYCO), released 3 Bt cotton hybrids for cultivation in India in March 2002. The 
release was with the approval of GEAC (Genetic Engineering Approval Committee). The 
domestic companies who licensed the Bt trait from Mahyco-Monsanto Biotech (MMB) paid a 
one-time license fee as well as royalty fee in order to avail the gene. In 2006, the government of 
Andhra Pradesh intervened to control seed prices and passed an ordinance directing MMB to 
reduce the price of 450 gm packet of Bollgard-I seeds from Rs 1600 to Rs 750. The other cotton 
growing states of India followed suit. 
    The literature has examined impact of seed prices on adoption of Bt cotton. There are two 
conflicting views regarding the impact of seed price intervention on adoption rates. According to 
one view, charging a lower price for Bt cotton seeds would not only make these seeds more 
accessible to farmers but may also increase profitability of firms (Qaim and Janvry, 2003). 
Motivated by the relatively low adoption rates in Argentina, Qaim and  Janvry (2003) analyzed 
farmers willingness to pay (WTP) for Bt cotton seeds and the expected level of demand for the 
new technology under different pricing regimes. They found the demand for GM seeds to be   4 
price responsive, and the WTP to be much lower than the current market price of Bt seeds in 
Argentina. Hence, they argued that reducing the Bt cotton seed prices would not only increase 
farmers profits but would also be more profitable for the seed producing company. 
    In contrast to the above paper, analyzing adoption of Bt cotton in India in the light of 
government seed price interventions, Sadashivappa and Qaim (2009) find a high WTP (close to 
the official market price) for Bt cotton seeds in India. According to them, the take off phase for 
Bt cotton had already begun before 2006 and thus the government seed price interventions had 
little impact on aggregate Bt cotton adoption. Instead,  seed price controls might reduce the 
incentive of the company to innovate in the future. Thus government interventions should be 
implemented after careful analysis of the long run implications of the policy on agricultural 
innovations. 
    This paper is motivated by the conflicting recommendations of the above two papers: while 
Qaim and Janvry are suggesting that seed price intervention in Argentina would result in 
increased adoption of Bt cotton, Sadashivappa and Qaim are arguing  that the impact of price 
controls on aggregate technology adoption in India is relatively small. Which of the two views 
characterizes adoption of Bt cotton in India? More specifically, what has been the impact of seed 
price intervention on percentage area under Bt cotton in India? We attempt to address these 
questions. 
    Pray and Rao (2008) have attempted cost-benefit analysis of seed price controls in case of Bt 
cotton in India for the short term and long term scenarios. While one would expect welfare of the 
farmers to change positively in the short run as cost of production are reduced due to price 
controls, in the long run these price distorting policies might reduce corporate investments in 
research and innovation thereby delaying the supply of new technology to farmers. Using 
secondary data analysis and an economic surplus model they find that the short term benefits to 
farmers from the price controls seem to outweigh potential losses in the long run.  
    Qaim and Basu (2007) have analyzed farmers  adoption decisions in response to pricing 
strategies of a foreign monopolist and a domestic supplier of conventional seeds. They show a 
positive correlation between the prices of GM and conventional seeds. By exploiting this 
strategic complementarity in the pricing of GM and conventional seeds they have evaluated a 
host of policy options in order to ensure wider coverage of GM seeds and also proper access to 
resource poor farmers.   5 
    Murugkar, Ramaswami and Shelar (2007) have discussed competition and monopoly in the 
cotton seed market. They mention two ways to access Bt hybrids, either a firm can license an 
already approved gene construct from a technology provider or can develop its own Bt gene by 
undertaking research and development. According to the paper, Bt related investment could be 
recouped easily if the firm follows the first route and these investments do not act as barriers to 
entry. Developing own Bt genes, on the other hand, is considerably more expensive.  In 2006, 
two domestic seed companies JK Agri Genetics Ltd and Nath Seeds Ltd opted for the second 
route and got regulatory approval for their Bt cotton hybrids which incorporated non-Monsanto 
genes. The paper argues that the competition from alternative genes could have a serious impact 
on the seed price because the alternative gene providers could target a trait value lower than that 
fixed by MMB. Hence, although the price ceilings were supposedly directed at controlling  
(MMBs) monopoly pricing, they probably disadvantaged the alternative gene providers like JK 
Seeds Ltd and Nath Seeds Ltd even more (as it could discourage their incentive to innovate due 
to huge costs involved). 
     As shown in Figure 1, the adoption of Bt cotton technology had spread rapidly in India 
between 2002-09. Since its approval for commercial  cultivation in 2002, there has been a 
considerable increase in the area under Bt cotton. In 2006, when the  price  controls were 
implemented, adoption rates recorded an increase of 192% over the previous year. The increase 
in area under Bt cotton was 63% in 2007and 23% in 2008.  
    After the initial approval of three hybrids, many more Bt cotton hybrids have been approved 
for cultivation in India. The initial hybrids contained the Bt gene cry1Ac owned by Monsanto 
which licensed the gene to MMB. In 2005, 20 Bollgard-I varieties were approved for cultivation 
by GEAC, some of which were specifically suited for agro-ecological conditions of the Northern 
zone. In May 2006, hybrids with stacked Bt genes, Bollgard II were approved for commercial 
release in the central and Northern zones. In the same year, JK Agri Genetics Ltd. and Nath 
Seeds Ltd also released their own approved events
1
                                                 
1 An event refers to the unique DNA recombination event that took place in one plant cell, which 
was then used to generate entire transgenic plants. Every cell that successfully incorporates the 
gene of interest represents a unique event. 
 of Bt cotton. Thus, the number of hybrids 
increased from 62 in 2006 to 131 in 2007 and further to 274 in 2008 (James C., 2008). Hence, 
the number of events as well as the number of cotton hybrids has all increased significantly since 
   6 
2002. This can be considered as the technological development that has increased portfolio of 
choice for farmers. (i.e., from 4 hybrids in 2004 the number went up to 274 in 2008).  Another 
important contribution of this study is to find effect of technological development (defined in 
terms of number of Bt hybrids approved for commercial cultivation) on the diffusion of Bt cotton 
in India.  This aspect has not been examined by any of the previous research papers.  
    Two broad approaches have been used in the literature for analyzing spread of new 
agricultural technologies. One approach is to study adoption decision of farmers using contingent 
valuation surveys and estimate their willingness to pay for the new technology. A limitation of 
such an approach is that WTP expressed in surveys may not reflect the actual purchase 
behaviour. It is known that individual decisions can differ drastically between when they are 
hypothetical as in the contingent valuation study or when they involve a real purchase decision.  
    The other approach is to study diffusion of technology in terms of percentage area adopted 
under the new technology. This approach examines adoption paths of agricultural technologies 
and economic factors affecting them. Diffusion is the process by which a successful innovation 
gradually becomes broadly used through adoption by firms and individuals (Jaffe et al., 2000). In 
this study, we use the second approach and analyze data on actual area under Bt cotton. It is  a 
panel data study, which covers 9 major cotton growing states, viz. Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan 
(Northern zone), Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat (Central zone), and Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (southern zone) for the period 2002-08. 
   Using a dynamic logistic model, it estimates impact of factors like seed price intervention, 
technological development, price of cotton, etc., on the diffusion of Bt cotton in India. We are 
interested in finding whether and to what extent the government seed price interventions in 2006 
have helped in increasing the diffusion rates. Another contribution of this research is finding 
effect of technological development on the  diffusion rates.  It also  attempts  to predict and 
compare diffusion paths under three alternative policy scenarios: no seed price intervention; seed 
price intervention; and a scenario where competition among alternative gene providers reduces 
the seed price to an intermediate level of Rs 1200. The results from the study offer insights into 
the economic determinants of diffusion of Bt cotton in India. The study has implications for both 
policy makers and the researchers. It will help policy makers in framing policies regarding seed 
prices and also procedures for approval of new hybrids. To the best of our knowledge, such a 
study has not been done for India.   7 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a background of 
government intervention in the form of introducing price controls in the Bt cotton seed market. 
This is followed by a description of the empirical motivation, methodology, description of the 
data, the estimation results and their interpretation, the comparative statics where we tried to 
trace  adoption paths  under three alternative scenarios and our conclusions and policy 
implications. 
 
Price controls and government intervention 
    Cotton is a major cash crop of India. It is mainly grown in 9 states spread over three zones 
namely Northern zone (Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan) Central zone (Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat 
Maharashtra) and Southern zone (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu). In 2002, Bt 
cotton hybrids were made commercially available to farmers in the central and southern zones of 
India. Realizing the potential of Bt-cotton, many Indian seed companies have shown interest in 
the technology and have sub-licensed it from MMB.   
    MMB dominated the market for cotton hybrids, either directly through selling hybrid seeds or 
indirectly through sub-licensing to private seed companies till 2005. The domestic companies 
who licensed Bt trait from MMB were required to pay a one-time license fee as well as royalty 
fee for availing a gene. This led to wider price differences between Bt and non-Bt hybrids. (In 
2004, Bt hybrids cost $19 more per acre compared to non-Bt hybrids; Murugkar, Ramaswami 
and Shelar, 2007). Until 2006, the price for official Bt cotton seeds in India was around Rs 1600 
per packet of 450 grams. Out of this, Rs 1250 was charged by MMB  (Mahyco-Monsanto 
Biotech) as the trait value. 
     The debate on Bt cotton pricing began in late 2005 when South India Cotton Association 
urged the seed companies to lower their seed prices. The idea gained popularity among various 
farmer organizations which led the state of Andhra Pradesh to impose certain regulations targeted 
to control Bt cotton seed prices, so as to make the technology affordable and accessible to small 
and marginal farmers in the state. In January 2006, the government of Andhra Pradesh filed a 
case with the Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC) against MMB 
for indulging in monopolistic trade practices with unreasonably high prices and limited technical 
developments. Thereafter, MMB appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the technology 
fee being charged was not for the sale of any goods but for the knowledge transfer to the sub   8 
licensees. In response to MRTPC Act imposed by the state of Andhra Pradesh, on May 11, 2006, 
MMB reduced the price for BG-I from Rs 1600 for a packet of 450 gm of seed to Rs 1200. The 
government of Andhra Pradesh felt that this was still too high a price, and in June 2006 further 
released an ordinance declaring that seed prices for Bt cotton seeds in the state would be capped 
at Rs 750 for a packet of 450 gm of seed (inclusive of technology fee). This pricing directive was 
soon adopted by other domestic firms such as Nath Seeds Ltd and JK Agri Genetics Ltd. The 
other states of India also adopted the same pricing. 
 
Empirical motivation and methodology 
    Studies estimating diffusion path have shown that cumulative adoption path often behaves like 
an S-shaped curve. The underlying premise being that diffusion occurs through interpersonal 
contacts among a group of homogenous adopters. When a new technology is introduced, 
adoption increases slowly at first because initially only the most progressive and less risk averse 
adopt and then it increases more rapidly as information spreads to other producers and finally it 
slows when nearly all producers who find the technology profitable have adopted, the process 
reaches a stable ceiling. This produces the classic ‘S-shaped’ diffusion curve. The logistic 
function is often used to represent the S-shaped diffusion process for agricultural innovations for 
its relative simplicity.  
    The literature has considered broadly two kinds of diffusion models: static diffusion 
model(Griliches 1960) and dynamic diffusion model (Knudson 1991, Jarvis 1981, Fernandez-
Cornejo 2002).The static diffusion models express diffusion path as a function of time and 
assume diffusion parameters to be constant over time. The dynamic diffusion models allow 
determinants of diffusion to change with time and therefore, may more accurately measure the 
rate of diffusion. For example, as the real price of an innovation decreases and stabilizes (as 
reflected in seed price reduction), the innovation becomes more attractive and is adopted more 
rapidly. While dynamic model could capture this change, a static model cannot. As a result of its 
flexible form, dynamic models enable researchers  to study impact of changes in economic 
variables on the pattern of diffusion. 
    The dynamic logistic models could be either variable ceiling models or variable slope models. 
The variable ceiling logistic model defines ceiling level (maximum rate of adoption) as a 
function of exogenous factors believed to influence adoption. Knudson (1991) used this model to   9 
study diffusion of semi dwarf wheat varieties in the U.S. A limitation of the variable ceiling 
logistic model is that there is no guarantee that the ceiling will stay at theoretically justifiable 
levels. In contrast to this, the variable slope logistic model allows the diffusion rate instead of the 
maximum number of adopters to vary as a function of exogenous factors. This model has several 
advantages. In this model, the rate of acceptance (slope) can vary and even be negative, given the 
movement of exogenous factors. It also allows the direct use of certain exogenous variables on 
the  diffusion  rate, and ceiling levels can be set at a theoretically justifiable level  (e.g., 100 
percent or lower). 
    An innovation’s profitability as compared with the traditional alternative is often regarded as 
the primary motivation behind adoption. This suggests that the widespread adoption of Bt cotton 
can be explained by its  perceived profitability over the conventional cotton. The expected 
profitability from Bt cotton can be measured as the difference between the revenue and the cost 
associated with new technology.  Thus, both seed prices and cotton prices could affect the rate of 
diffusion through affecting profitability of the technology. Besides prices of cotton and seed, 
technological development could affect rate of diffusion. Since all these factors are impacting the 
rate of diffusion rather than the ceiling, we use a variable slope dynamic logistic model for our 










The right hand side measures the proportion of the total acreage under cotton planted with Bt 
seeds. Pit denotes the percentage area under Bt cotton in state i at time t. K is the adoption ceiling 
representing the maximum rate of adoption in the long run equilibrium. The term t is a time 
trend, a represents the origin parameter and it captures the date of availability of Bt cotton and b 
represents the slope coefficient or rate of diffusion of Bt cotton. The z variable denotes economic 
variables that are influencing the rate of diffusion (b) of Bt cotton in India. 
     We keep the ceiling to be fixed with K=100 and allow the coefficient of diffusion (b) to be a 
function of exogenous factors like price of seed, technological development, price of cotton etc. 
We also assume the origin parameter a to be fixed. 
 The mathematical derivation of our regression equation is discussed below. 
Equation (1) can be linearized to   10 









where   ( , ,) sc b fPPT =  
 More specifically, b  is assumed to be a linear function of seed prices, cotton prices  and 
technological development.  
  12 3 . . . (3)
it it s c it bP p T ββ β = ++  
where Ps, pc and T denote seed prices, cotton prices and technological development, respectively. 
 Plugging in (2) we get, 
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 We analyze three variations of the variable slope dynamic logistic model.  Their specific 
functional form is given below and the motivation for using them would be explained later. 
The first model introduces six year dummies (for the years 2003 to 2008) in order to see the year 
specific impact on the diffusion rates.  
 
Model 1: Dynamic logistic model with year dummies 
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Plugging (5) in (2), we get 
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 captures the actual to potential percentage area under Bt cotton. We are using 
number of hybrids of Bollgard-I approved for commercial cultivation in India as a proxy for 
technological development.  
 
Model 2: Dynamic logistic model with two interaction dummies   11 
 Model 2 introduces two interaction terms, viz., T05 = d05* T (which is dummy for year 2005 * 
technological development)  and  T06  = d06  * T  (dummy for year 2006  * technological 
development) in the regression equation. 
1 2 3 4 05 5 06 6 04 7 05 8 06 9 07 . . . . . . . . . (7)
it it s c it bP p T T T D D D D ββ ββ β β β β β = + ++ + + + + +  
Putting (7) in (2), we get 
1 . 2 3 4 05 5 06 6 2004 7 2005
8 2006 9 2007
log( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Model 3: Dynamic logistic model after dropping one interaction term 
Model 3 is an extension of model 2 where we have dropped the interaction term, T06. 
1 . 2 3 4 05 5 2004 6 2005
7 2006 8 2007
log( ) . . . . . . . . .
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Econometric specification and data 
For this study, the three models specified above are estimated using generalized least squares 





 .  
Here, it P  is (area under Bt cotton/area under cotton) *100. Data on area under Bt cotton is taken 
from ISAAA Brief 41, Global status of commercialized GM crops, Clive James (2009), and data 
on aggregate area under cotton cultivation is obtained from Cotton Corporation of India (CCI).  
    Table 1 presents percentage area under Bt cotton for 9 major states from 2002 to 2008. For the 
explanatory variable seed prices, we have used the price for a packet of 450 gms of Bt seed, 
Bollgard 1. Data on price of Bollgard-I is obtained from Internal Mahyco- Monsanto Biotech 
Estimates. (For some of the years, data represents an average rather than an exact price.) The 
second variable cotton prices 
it c p  are the average annual prices of cotton. More specifically, 
these are the average price of Kapas (raw cotton) for major varieties, which includes Bengal   12 
Desi, LRA, J-34, H-4, S-6 and DCH-32.  Price of cotton is again taken from Handbook of 
Statistics, Cotton Corporation of India (CCI). CCI publishes average annual prices of kapas (raw 
cotton).  
    The variable  it T captures technological development, i.e., the number of hybrids of Bt cotton 
(Bollgard-I) approved for commercial cultivation in India. Data on the number of hybrids of 
Bollgard-I approved in India is taken  from Indian GMO Research Information System 
(IGMORIS). It may be noted that this study captures technological development in terms of 
number of approved hybrids of Bollgard-I only, and does not include Bollgard II or other 
hybrids.   
    Table 3 illustrates that in year 2006, there was a one shot decline, from Rs.1600 to Rs.750, in 
the price of a packet of 450 gm of Bollgard -1 seeds for all three cotton growing zones of India. 
The common approach of introducing a dummy variable that takes value 0 for the pre-policy 
period and 1 in the post-policy period for analyzing such policy intervention is not appropriate 
for our case. Since the policy intervention changed seed prices in a one shot fashion, the variable, 
seed prices, itself works as a policy dummy. Thus in order to avoid muticollinearity problem 
between policy dummy and seed prices we are not introducing a separate policy dummy.  
    This is a panel data study. We conducted Hausman test to check whether fixed effect or 
random effect model is more appropriate for our purpose. Table 4 shows that the Hausman test 
statistic is insignificant. So we accept the null hypothesis that random effect model is appropriate 
in our case.  
 
Model Estimation and Interpretation of Regression Results 
    Table 2 tabulates regression results of three dynamic logistic models using generalized least 
squares (GLS) techniques based on panel data. Column 2 presents the results pertaining to model 
1. It is evident that the model provides a good fit to the data with an adjusted R-square of 0.82. 
Most of the variables are significant and have the expected signs. Note that coefficient of 
it s P is 
significant at 11 percent level and has the expected negative sign. It implies that the diffusion 
rate (b) is negatively and significantly related to the price of the seed indicating that as seed 
prices decline the incentive to adopt Bt cotton increases. From (5) it also implies that a one rupee 
decline in seed prices will lead to 0.038% increase in the diffusion rate. As discussed earlier, 
since there is no variability in the data on seed prices other than that caused by government   13 
intervention, seed prices themselves would act as policy dummy and the significance of this 
variable implies that the government seed price interventions in 2006 were successful in 
impacting the diffusion rate.  
    The rate of diffusion is positively and significantly related to cotton prices suggesting that as 
cotton prices rise the incentive to adopt Bt cotton increases. Further a rupee increase in 
it c p will 
lead to 0.041% increase in the  rate of diffusion of Bt cotton. Similarly the coefficient for 
technological development ( . it Tt ) is significant at around 8 percent level and has the expected 
positive sign which again implies that as the number of hybrids approved of Bt cotton increases 
rate of diffusion also increases. In particular, a unit increase in  it T  will lead to 0.34% increase in 
diffusion rates.  
    Column 2 of Table 2 also shows significance of various years on the diffusion rate.  While 
years 2006 and 2007 are significant at around 11 percent, year 2005 is significant at around 6 
percent and the value of the coefficient is much larger as compared to 2006 and 2007. This is an 
interesting result and suggests that some significant changes must have occurred in 2005 that had 
considerable impact on the diffusion rate and ultimately on the percentage area under Bt cotton 
(Pit). It motivates us to look for the changes that may have had a significant impact on the 
diffusion of Bt cotton in India in year 2005. Around 20 new hybrids of Bollgard-I were 
introduced in year 2005 and among these some were specifically suited for agro-ecological 
conditions of the northern zone. Hence in order to see whether the increase in diffusion rates in 
2005 and 2006 could be explained by technological development or not, we introduce 2 
interaction terms, namely,  T05 (T05 = d05*T) and T06 (T06 = d06 *T) in Model 2. 
    From Column 3 of Table 2, it can be seen that model 2 also provides a good fit to the data with 
an adjusted R-square of 0.83. Here also all the coefficients have the expected signs. Technology 
coefficient ( it T ) and price of cotton (
it c p ) are significant at 10 percent and 1 percent, 
respectively. But an important thing to note is that while the coefficient for the interaction term 
(T05)  is significant at around 12 percent, coefficient for d2005  (year dummy for 2005) is 
insignificant. This implies that the effect of the number of varieties was stronger in 2005 than in 
other year. This confirms our earlier research that in 2005 there was for the first time Bt varieties 
commercialized for northern India. Also note that both the coefficients for T06 and d2006  are   14 
insignificant. We check possibility of multicollinearity among these two variables by conducting 
an F test
2
    Our F test results suggest that the coefficient for T06 is less significant than d2006. Hence, in 
Model 3 we have dropped the interaction term T06. The results of Model 3 are presented in 
Column 4 of Table 2. Interestingly, the coefficient of d2006 became significant in Model 3. In our 
final model, i.e., model 3, we find that while the price of the seed is significant at around 7 
percent, technology coefficient is significant at around 5 percent. Also cotton prices are 
significant at 1 percent, and all three variables have the expected signs. The coefficient of seed 
prices in column 4 also suggests that a rupee decline in seed prices will lead to 0.038% increase 
in the diffusion rates. Also a unit increase in technological development and cotton prices will 
lead to 0.36% and 0.039% increase in the diffusion rates, respectively. Another interesting 
feature to note is that d2006, which was insignificant in the previous model is now significant at 10 
percent. This again suggests that other than changes in seed prices, technological development, 
and cotton prices, something else happened in 2006 which impacted the diffusion rates and 
ultimately the percentage area under Bt cotton in India.  
 for both variables individually.   
    One possible factor could be the introduction of Bollgard II in the Northern, Central and 
Southern zones of India in 2006. Apart from Bollgard II, J.K Agri Genetics Ltd and Nath Seeds 
Ltd had also introduced some events which further increased portfolio of choice for farmers and 
may have led to an increase in the diffusion rates. Thus, the increase in the adoption of Bt cotton 
in 2006 cannot be attributed entirely to the seed price interventions of the government of India, 
approval of certain specific events and hybrids of Bt cotton (Bollgard II) may also have 
contributed to an increase in the adoption. 
    Using the estimated coefficients from Model 3, we estimate percentage area under Bt cotton 
(Pit ). Figure 2 plots the actual versus estimated area under Bt cotton for each state separately. 








=  ; where m is number of restriction in the restricted model, n is number of 
observation, and k is number of parameters of the unrestricted model. 
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Here the percentage area under Bt cotton is plotted on the vertical-axis and years are on the 
horizontal axis. These graphs depict that our Model 3 fits in quite well for almost all the states. 
 
In order to compare the Goodness of fit of different models we have applied the criteria of 
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where,  it P
∧
is the estimated percentage area under Bt cotton, and 
           it P is the average of the estimated area under Bt cotton. 
In terms of adjusted R- square, all the three models had similar values. However, model 3 
has the highest explained variation amongst the three models. 
    From the results, it is clear that seed price interventions of the government were significant in 
impacting the diffusion rates at least in the short run.  Our study also sheds light on the 
significance of technological development in impacting the diffusion rates. To examine the 





Using the values of coefficients estimated in model 3, we will now do comparative statics to 
predict diffusion paths under different scenarios and compare them with the base scenario.  
Scenario I: Base scenario  
The base scenario is the estimated diffusion path using estimated coefficients and actual data on 
percentage area under Bt cotton. 
Scenario II: No seed price intervention 
Since the focus of this paper is on determining the effect of seed price intervention on the 
percentage area under Bt cotton, the second scenario traces diffusion path if the government had 
not intervened in seed prices, and the seed prices continued at the rate of Rs 1600 for a packet of 
450 gm.  
    Another interesting scenario would be to allow competition among the gene providers bring 
down seed prices instead of government intervention doing it. Murugkar, Ramaswami and Shelar   16 
(2007) have argued that competition among alternative seed companies like J.K Agri Genetics 
Ltd and Nath Seeds Ltd would reduce the seed prices on its own. Due to this competition, seed 
prices may not go down drastically to Rs 750 but may take some intermediate value. To capture 
this possibility we consider the scenario, where seed prices are reduced from Rs1600 to Rs1200 
in year 2006 and trace the diffusion path for this case.  
Scenario III: Prices for Bt cotton seeds are brought down to Rs 1200 for a packet of 450 gm in 
2006 and remain at that level. 
To compare diffusion paths under alternative scenarios we are assuming that except for seed 
prices, the values for all other variables remain same as in the base scenario. To be able to do 
that, the implicit assumption is that variables are not interrelated. Although seed prices can affect 
incentives for developing new hybrids, it takes a fairly long time to develop new hybrids of any 
seed and thus it is reasonable to assume that this effect would not have manifested itself in the 
short run. Similarly since domestic cotton prices are influenced by the cotton prices in the world 
market, seed prices are unlikely to affect cotton prices over the period studied.  
    Figure 3 illustrates these comparisons. The gap between the blue and the pink line traces the 
change in the percentage area under Bt cotton due to seed price interventions. Thus, a substantial 
gap between the two lines indicates that seed price interventions were significant in impacting 
the adoption of Bt cotton in India at least in the short run for almost all states. However, the gap 
between the blue and the yellow line depicts the change in the percentage area if seed prices had 
been brought down due to market competition. We find that the diffusion path with seed prices at 
Rs1200 (since 2006) lies above the path of diffusion without interventions. This implies that 
competition among alternative gene providers would reduce the seed prices on its own rather 
than government doing it and would ultimately increase the adoption of Bt cotton. This has some 
policy implication which is discussed in the next section. 
 
Conclusion 
Using  state level data for the period 2002-2008, this study analyzes impact of seed price 
interventions and technological development on diffusion of Bt cotton in India.  
    We have tried to examine whether and to what extent the government seed price interventions 
in 2006 have helped in increasing the diffusion rates. In the process we examine other factors   17 
such as technological development, cotton prices, etc. responsible for an increase in the diffusion 
rates of Bt cotton in India. 
    Using three variations of dynamic logistic model with variable slope coefficient, we found that 
the variables (seed prices, technological development and cotton prices) are significant and have 
the expected signs. The coefficient for seed prices is negative which implies that a decline in 
seed prices will lead to an increase in the diffusion rates. However,  both technological 
developments as well as cotton prices are positively impacting the diffusion rates.  Further the 
significance of our interaction term (T05) implied that the effect of the number of varieties was 
stronger in 2005 than in other year. This can be attributed to the introduction of around 20 new 
hybrids of Bollgard-I in year 2005.  Among these some were specifically suited for agro-
ecological conditions of the Northern zone.  
    We found that the coefficient of technological development was positive and significant in 
impacting the diffusion rates. Also the dummy for the year 2006 was significant which implies 
that apart from seed prices, technological development and cotton prices, some other factors 
impacted the diffusion rates in 2006. There could be various reasons for this. One reason could 
be the introduction of Bollgard II in 2006 in the Northern, Central and Southern zones of India. 
Also, there were certain events introduced by J.K Agri Genetics Ltd and Nath Seeds Ltd which 
also increased the portfolio of choice for farmers and may have led to an increase in the diffusion 
rates. Thus, the increase in percentage area under Bt cotton in 2006 cannot be attributed entirely 
to seed price interventions of the government rather certain other factors like approval of some 
specific events and hybrids (Bollgard II) of Bt cotton would have led to an increase in the 
adoption of Bt cotton in India. This suggests that although seed price reductions were successful 
in increasing the diffusion rates over the period studied but its impact was limited.   
    Our results provide inputs for the government policy by quantifying the effect of government 
seed price intervention on diffusion rates. Further they suggest that the impact of government 
seed price reductions was limited hence, government should look for other policies which would 
enhance the diffusion rates and improve overall welfare. One could be simplifying the process of 
approval of Bt hybrids. Lalita, Pray and Ramaswami (2008) have discussed that our current 
regulatory framework for approval of Bt hybrids is very complex and time consuming and it has 
acted as an entry barrier for new genes. Hence, in order to streamline the process of approval of 
Bt hybrids and to ensure technological development government should further simplify the   18 
procedure of approval of Bt hybrids. This will ensure the benefits not only to the farmers in 
terms of greater portfolio of choices which will increase the diffusion rates but also for the 
company as it will protect their interests to innovate in the future. Also, simplification of our 
regulatory procedure would encourage new seed companies to come in which would enforce 
competition among them. This competition among alternative gene providers could reduce the 
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Table1 : Percentage adoption of Bt cotton in 9 major states from 2002 to 2008. 

















Andhra Pradesh  0.99  1.19  6.66  27.10  85.3  95.7  98.14 
Gujarat  0.61  2.18  6.4  7.8  19.6  37.4  56.2 
Madhya Pradesh  0.36  2.19  13.8  23.5  48.5  79.3  94.6   20 
 
Northern Zone  
(Punjab, Haryana  
and Rajasthan) 
      3.72  14.4  47.8  69.1 
Karnataka  0.27  1.27  3.45  7.26  22.4  36.06  61.5 
Tamil Nadu  2.35  6.79  3.87  19.2  45  58.8  75 
 













Table2. Estimation results of 3 different models for 9 states from 2002-08. 
Dependent 
variable: 
Log( Pit / K – Pit )      Define 







on 9 states from 
2002-08 for 
Model 1. 
 Random  effects        
panel regression  
    on 9 states from  
    2002-08 for  
 Model 2. 
Random effects    
panel regression 
on 9 states from    







   -5.036674    
  
   -4.516211        
    
    -4.768946     
.
it s Pt  
  -.0003853*          -.0005521        -.0003811 **    21 
.
it c pt  
  .0004145 ***        .0004354***         .0003933 ***  
. it Tt  
  .0034174 *       .0033621*          .0036701 **   
2003 D     0.165856        
2004 D    0.2774892       0.3329655        0.2557017    
2005 D    0.4741183 **       0.1610635        0.0059502    
2006 D    0.1771958 *       0.3742744        0.164289*    
2007 D    0.1200054*        0.1129435 *       0.1089667 * 
T05       0.0382094 *      .0395252 *    
T06      -0.0082176     
R Squared 
 
within  = 0.8800 
between = 0.0534 
overall = 0.8160                                                                                 
within = 0.8854 
between= 0.0557  
overall = 0.8265                                                                                                         
   within = 0.8842 
  between  
   = 0.0566  
   overall = 0.8267  
                                                                                                        
Wald Chi(2)  Waldchi2(8)          
=275.04*** 
Waldchi2(9)        
=    287.59*** 
   Wald chi2(8)       




  54    54      54 
 
 
Note:  ***, **, * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent respectively. 
 
 
Fig1. Adoption of Bt cotton in India, 2002 to 2009 (Million hectares)   22 
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Adoption of Bt cotton in India(Million hectares)
 
Source: James C (2009), Preview: Global status of commercial Biotech Crops: 
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Fig 2 Actual vs estimated area under Bt cotton for 9 major states  

































































































































































































































































































































































































    
                   The blue line denotes the actual percentage area under Bt cotton. 















































      
    
        
 
 
Fig 3 Actual percentage area under Bt cotton (with interventions) vs estimated area under 
Bt cotton (without interventions i.e. seed price at Rs1600) vs estimated area when seed 






































































































































































































































































































































































The blue line shows the estimated area under Bt cotton with government    
         intervention. 
The pink line shows the estimated area under Bt cotton without government   
         intervention. 
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Table 3: Price of Bollgard-1 across all three zones of India from 2002-08. 
Year  Central Zone  Northern zone  Southern zone 
2002  1600       1600 
2003  1600       1600 
2004  1600       1600 
2005  1675     1675     1675 
2006  750     1390       750 
2007  750       750       750 
2008  650       750       750 
Source: Mahyco Monsanto Biotech estimates 
 
 
Table 4. Hausman Test (Random effect or fixed effect model) 
 
Hausman fixed        Ho: difference in                      
                                 coefficients not systematic.               
                                 chi2(4) = 1.54 
                                  Prob>chi2 =      0.851 
 
 
Table 5:Results of F test  
  
F test after dropping T06   
 T06=0                                                                                              
chi2(  1) =    0.21 
 Prob > chi2 =  0.6495 
                                        
 
F test after dropping d2006       
d2006=0                                          
chi2(  1) =    0.63 
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Table 6. Number of Hybrids approved of Bollgard-1 event across all 3 zones since 2002-08. 
Year  Central Zone  Northern Zone  Southern Zone 
2002  3    3 
2003  3    3 
2004  4    4 
2005  15  6  12 
2006  31  12  26 
2007  62  25  55 
2008  82  28  84 




Table 7 Average Annual Price of kapas (raw cotton) for major varieties – Bengal Desi, 
LRA, J-34, H-4, S-6 and DCH-32. 
 
       Year       Price of cotton (in Rs per quintal) 
        
       2002 
                  
                 1840.6 
       2003                    2278 
       2004                    2556.6 
       2005                    2041.5 
       2006                    2381.6 
       2007                    2297.2 
       2008                    2559.45 
       2009                    2887.5 
Source: Handbook of statistics, Cotton Corporation of India (CCI)  
 
 
 